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The use of non-cash payment schemes is particularly widespread in France where the number of non-cash
transactions is in fact well above the European average.
Though they have different features corresponding to users’ varying needs (payments may be face-to-face,
remote or recurring, for instance), non-cash payment schemes generally consist of an instrument that
generates a payment order combined with the technical and organisational arrangements that enable this
order to be processed. Putting these arrangements in place requires close co-operation between all
participants of the payment «network», i.e., naturally, credit institutions that hold accounts for debtors and
beneficiaries, and also their technical service providers.
The Everyday Security Act of 15 November 2001 entrusts the Banque de France with a specific task with
regard to overseeing the security of non-cash means of payment. This task falls naturally within the
purview of central banks, which guarantee both the value of the currency and the stability of payment
systems.
To carry out its task, the Banque de France analyses the potential threats associated with payment
schemes and defines, in consultation with the parties involved, the minimum security objectives designed
to prevent the occurrence of payment-specific risk events. To assess the security of a payment scheme,
the Banque de France ensures that the parties involved comply with these objectives.92 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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N
on-cash payment instruments such as cards,
cheques, credit transfers and direct debits
are used very extensively in France. Their
use is on the rise and greatly superior to that observed
in a large number of other European countries. This
specificity, which is mainly due to (i) the fact that a
large proportion of households hold bank accounts
and (ii) the existence of laws providing for the
compulsory use of non-cash payment instruments
in a number of cases, notably for tax reasons, persists
notwithstanding the emergence of a single European
payments area. In fact, most transactions continue
to be cleared and settled within domestic
infrastructures and comply with national technical
standards and organisational principles.1
The Banque de France attaches particular
importance to the efficiency and security of
non-cash payment schemes given the prevalence
of non-cash transactions. The Banque de France’s
statutory tasks in the area of the security of payment
schemes have accordingly been clarified and its
means of action strengthened by Law.
This article presents the main features of the
payment instruments used in France (Part 1), sheds
light on the rationale underpinning the Banque de
France’s oversight of payment schemes (Part 2) and
describes the implementation procedures for this
oversight task (Part 3).
1| COMMON FEATURES
OF NON-CASH PAYMENT
INSTRUMENTS USED IN FRANCE
The range of non-cash payment instruments offered
is wide and the ways in which these instruments
are used vary depending on users’ differing
requirements. All payment schemes are
nevertheless characterised by the combination of
(see Box 1):
• a payment instrument (paper-based or electronic),
which allows users to make payment orders by
cheque, card, credit transfer, electronic purse,
software installed on the user’s computer, procedure
for recording orders, etc.;  
• the technical and organisational arrangements that
support the processing of payment orders.
In fact, transmitting a payment order is not sufficient
to transfer the funds held on account by a financial
intermediary (account money). This intermediary has
to carry out a number of operations in order to execute
the transfer, which requires the implementation of a
technical and organisational infrastructure that is more
or less complex and aims to: (i) ensure the validity of
orders issued by users, (ii) collect these orders and (iii)
transmit the information required for the execution
of the funds transfer (e.g. account identification). The
actual transfer of funds, i.e. payment, is carried out
via clearing and settlement functions between credit
institutions.
The processing of a payment order may involve one
or several financial intermediaries, depending on
whether the payment instrument used is issued and
accepted by all institutions – so-called “universal”
payment instruments, for instance cheques –,
whether it is used and accepted by a limited number
or, lastly, by just one institution – e.g. store cards.
When the debtor and the creditor have separate
financial intermediaries, it is necessary for the
payment instruments and orders to be standardised
so that each intermediary is able to process them.
Under French law, only credit institutions are
authorised to act as financial intermediaries in this
type of activity because the provision of payment
instruments to the general public as well as the
management of payment schemes are considered
banking operations that are subject to banking
monopoly (Article L. 311-3 of the French Monetary
and Financial Code).2 The Commission bancaire
(French Banking Commission) is thus called upon
to supervise the credit institutions specialised in the
management of means of payment on an individual
basis. The Commission bancaire’s supervision is not
in fact limited to these specialised institutions, but
extends to all credit institutions that issue and
manage payment instruments. The Commission
bancaire supervises this activity from the point of
view of operational risk. Payment instruments
issuance and management shall be subject to an
ad hoc prudential treatment within the framework
of the reform of the international solvency ratio
introduced by the Basel II accord.
1 A detailed presentation of the use of the various means of payment and the ongoing changes in the European framework is provided in the
Appendix.
2 These credit institutions may have recourse to agents for the provision of technical services.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 93
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Box 1
The two processing phases of a non-cash payment
The processing of a non-cash payment may be broken down into two phases. 1
The transaction phase corresponds to the initiation, validation and transmission of the payment order. Depending on the
type of instrument used, it is:
• a credit order (e.g. a credit transfer) given directly by the debtor to its financial intermediary, or
• a debit order (e.g. cheque, payment card or direct debit) transmitted from the debtor to the creditor (or initiated directly by
the latter in the case of a direct debit), then remitted by the creditor to its financial intermediary. The latter then requests the
debtor’s intermediary to debit its customer’s account.
Several functions are implemented in the transaction phase. They aim mainly to verify the identities of the parties involved
and the authenticity of the payment instrument used.
In the clearing and settlement phase the payment is completed through the clearing and settlement of the payment
order between the financial intermediaries of the debtor and creditor. The functions implemented in this phase consist of
gathering the different orders received for batch processing, calculating the respective claims, and exchanging them
together with the information required for the identification of debtors and  creditors in order to finalise the payments. The
exchanges may be direct between two financial intermediaries, either because these intermediaries belong to the same
bank or group (" intrabank" or "intra-group" exchanges) or because two different intermediaries have signed "bilateral"
exchange agreements. More frequently, the exchanges transit through exchange and clearing systems such as the Système
Interbancaire de Télécompensation - SIT, the French Interbank Teleclearing System.
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By way of illustration, the Appendix includes a
simplified description of the way in which cheque
payments work following the switch to truncated
cheques (Box 3), as well as a presentation of the
“CB” bank card payment scheme (Box 4).
2| UNDERPINNINGS AND
OBJECTIVES OF THE BANQUE
DE FRANCE’S OVERSIGHT
Payment instruments users’ confidence in the
procedures implemented by the financial
intermediaries with whom they entrust their funds
is an essential factor in their acceptance of these
instruments. In this area, the security and efficiency
of payment schemes – the primary responsibility
of financial intermediaries – are important issues,
particularly given the specific risks associated with
the payment business.
2|1 Risks liable to jeopardise
the smooth functioning and
security of payment schemes
Issuing and executing a payment order call for the
implementation of a more or less complex technical
and organisational infrastructure (see Box 1) that
may engender various risks, which in turn could
jeopardise the security and efficiency of the
payment scheme:
• Risks of malfunctioning. A credit institution may,
for example, be temporarily or permanently unable
to process its customers’ orders or collect amounts
due. Besides the financial difficulties that could
result from this for the institution and, possibly,
the other banks with which it does business, such
malfunctioning could significantly disrupt the
smooth execution of economic transactions and
undermine the confidence of the users of the
payment scheme in question.
• Risks of fraud (misappropriation of the payment
instrument by a wrongful beneficiary). Both the
payment instrument itself and the technical and
organisational arrangements that support the
processing of payment orders must be adequately
protected from fraudulent misuse. This risk is
particularly strong when both the instrument and
the arrangements for the processing of orders are
computerised because the technical security of the
payment scheme then depends directly on the
existing computer environment. The changing
nature of information technologies spawns new
threats linked to the increasing sophistication of
hacking techniques and the development of vectors
that propagate these hacking attacks. It is therefore
crucial to be constantly reactive in the face of such
threats.
• Governance risk. This could be triggered by lack of
anticipation, responsiveness, transparency or
oversight by institutions that play a role in the
payment chain, leading to the inadequacy of the
technical, operational and organisational solutions
adopted by these institutions.
• Legal risks that usually arise from non-compliance
with legal requirements and emerge in situations
of conflict linked to the contractual relations
between the parties involved (issuers, service
providers, customers, merchants, etc.). The risks can
also result from possible contradictions between
rules, professional standards or contractual
obligations.
• Reputational risk, which could harm the reputation
of a payment scheme or one of its promoters. This
risk mainly hinges on the real or supposed gravity
of one or several of the risks described above as
well as the level of media coverage given to the risk.




The risks liable to affect payment schemes
(see above) must be controlled in order to ensure
the smooth and secure functioning of these
schemes. As described in Box 1, a payment scheme
may be presented as a “network” whose “nodes” 3
are the operators involved in the payment (debtors,
creditors, financial intermediaries, etc.), which
3 See McAndrews (J.J.) (1999): “Network Issues and Payment Systems”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 95
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exchange the information required to settle the
transaction – information flows for example from
the creditor to its bank, then possibly from the
creditor’s bank to the debtor’s bank via a clearing
and settlement system.
The development of such a “network” is based on
the complementarity of the requirements of the
operators involved. To be used by the largest number
of people, a payment scheme must first meet users’
(debtors and creditors) needs. This means the widest
possible acceptance, low cost of use and sufficient
security to guarantee final settlement of transactions
and protection from fraud. This virtuous circle is
particularly apparent in card payment schemes: the
greater the number of card holders, the more
worthwhile it is for retailers to put in place acceptance
systems to facilitate their sales, and the greater
incentive card holders have to use cards to settle
their purchases. Users therefore assess the utility of
a payment scheme based on the size of the “network”.
The need to develop the “network” while keeping
the related investments in check leads naturally to
co-operation between credit institutions. This
co-operation calls for compatibility between the
technical rules and standards that generate payment
orders and processing. The various operators
involved in the provision of payment instruments
and the processing of payment orders must agree
upon the methods and formats for the exchange of
information. This compatibility is generally based
on the standardisation of the procedures associated
with processing, as well as strong governance of the
payment “network” in order to guarantee the
effective implementation of standards by all parties
involved (mainly banks and creditors).
Standardisation is therefore a vital vector of
efficiency and generally results in economies of
scale for all members of the “network".
To meet this need, in 1930, the French banking
industry set up the Comité français d’organisation et
de normalisation bancaires or CFONB (the French
Committee for Banking Organisation and Standards).
It brings together all the financial institutions in the
main aim of defining the rules and standards
required for the smooth and secure functioning of
payments. The Association française de normalisation
(AFNOR — the French Standards Association)
considers it as the bureau of standards in the field of
banking. In the area of card-based transactions, a
co-operative structure, the Groupement des Cartes
bancaires “CB” (“CB” Bank Card Consortium) was set
up in 1984 on the initiative of the major French credit
institutions. Currently made up of some
150 members, the “CB” Consortium is responsible
for setting standards for cards issued by its members
and ensures the security of the entire system of
issuance and acceptance of approximately 48 million
“CB” cards.
In such a co-operative system, the organisational
and technical solutions adopted by the institutions
must therefore also combine efficiency with the
security of their payment network. Indeed,
supplying the public with overly expensive
payment services could lead to the public shunning
these payment schemes, as could the provision of
means of payment that are insecure or easy targets
for fraud. An optimal balance between the
efficiency and security of payment services must
therefore be constantly sought.
Seeking this balance, which is a key element in the
success of any payment scheme, is a task that falls
first and foremost to credit institutions. A public
authority may nonetheless take action to help to
maintain the level of co-operation required for this
optimal balance. Monitoring the co-operative
initiatives necessarily undertaken by the industry
is therefore, naturally, one of the objectives of the
oversight of non-cash payment schemes.
2|3 The role played
by the Banque de France
Historically, central banks have acted as guardians
of the currency, a public good whose value must
be preserved. This guardianship extends to
non-cash payment schemes, which now stand in
for cash in the overwhelming majority of
economic transactions. It is therefore crucial for
payment orders to be properly executed and for
financial intermediaries that are in charge of funds
held on account to be managed in a sound and
prudent manner. This is the aim of the prudential
regulation with which credit institutions are
required to comply.
The oversight of payment schemes is therefore a
natural concern for central banks – public authorities
that have the independence required to ensure a
level playing field for all parties involved.96 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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This concern shared by all central banks became a
legal obligation for the Banque de France with the
passing of the Everyday Security Act of
15 November 2001.
In accordance with the Act, which amended
Article L. 141-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code,
the Banque de France is charged with “overseeing
the security of means of payment other than
banknotes and coins, as well as the relevance of
standards applicable thereto. To perform its duty,
the Banque de France may carry out assessments
and collect any useful information. In addition, if
it considers that any such means of payment
provides insufficient security guarantees, it may
recommend that the issuer takes all the necessary
measures to remedy this situation. If the Bank’s
recommendations are not put into effect, it may,
after having solicited the observations of the issuer,
decide to issue a negative opinion in the Journal
officiel (the French government gazette)". The
Banque de France’s legal powers have thus been
strengthened.
The task assigned to the Banque de France also
falls within the framework of the Eurosystem’s
duties. The Maastricht Treaty in fact entrusts the
European Central Bank (ECB) and the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB) with the task of
ensuring the smooth functioning of payment
systems (Article  105-2), which also means
overseeing the non-cash payment instruments
processed by these systems (see ECB statement,
June 2000).




To conduct its oversight, the Banque de France
analyses the potential threats associated with
payment schemes and defines, in consultation with
the parties involved, minimum security objectives
designed to prevent the occurrence of payment-specific
risk events. To assess the security of a payment
scheme, the Bank ensures that the parties involved
comply with these objectives.
To this end, the Bank’s oversight approach takes
account of the changing nature of the information
systems put in place. Even when there are no
changes in the means of payment scheme itself,
there is likely to be some modification in its
operational environment. In addition, new threats
may arise from regular improvements in hacking
techniques. They may weaken the real level of
technical protection and, hence, the security of
payment schemes. Oversight must therefore be
based on the regular monitoring and supervision of
the security and efficiency of payment schemes.
The Banque de France acts in close co-operation
with all the operators that make up the payment
“network” (the general public, merchants, issuers,
etc.). With a view to guaranteeing the required level
playing field for all these operators, it defines with
total transparency the criteria used to assess the
efficiency and security of payment schemes. Lastly,
it refrains from hampering technological innovation
and addresses itself to remaining neutral in the
competition between issuers of payment
instruments and between the various payment
schemes themselves.
3|2 Implementation procedures
The Monetary and Financial Code sets out the
obligations of the Banque de France with regard to
the oversight of means of payment by defining its
tasks in this area and its scope of application
(Article L. 141-4). To perform its duty, the Bank
must:
• have precise knowledge of the operators and
payment schemes subject to oversight;
• provide itself with means of action;
• outline criteria for assessing payment schemes
security;
• regularly assess the security of payment schemes
with regard to issuers and managers and monitor
changes made to the payment scheme to resolve
the problems identified.
SCOPE OF APPLICATION
The oversight scope should cover the security and
efficiency of the payment scheme, from the
transaction phase (see Box 1) right up to the validationBanque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 97
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and transmission of the payment order. The oversight
scope encompasses the payment instrument as well
as the technical and organisational procedures that
support the processing of the payment order.
All the operators involved in the payment
“network” as described in section 2 therefore fall
naturally within the scope of the Bank’s oversight:
credit institutions and interbank bodies responsible
for the joint management or monitoring of the
security of certain payment schemes (e.g. the “CB”
Bank Card Consortium for bank cards, La société
financière du porte-monnaie électronique interbancaire
–SFPMEI– and the Billettique Monétique Services –
BMS– for electronic purses), technical operators
whose services in respect of payment schemes may
have a significant security impact and users of
payment schemes (debtors or creditors) insofar as
they may also contribute to fraud prevention.
MEANS OF ACTION
The Monetary and Financial Code states that the
Banque de France “shall ask […] for all relevant
information concerning means of payment.” The
Banque de France therefore has numerous
sources of information (internal control reports,
fraud statistics, public information, etc.). In this
regard, it may call not only on credit institutions
and interbank bodies, but also on all service
providers or operators that play a role in the
payment chain, for instance accepting merchants.
This legal provision enables a first level of
analysis and verification of the security of the
payment scheme as a whole.
The analysis of the information collected may help
to identify the payment schemes that have
insufficient security guarantees and lead the
Banque de France to carry out assessments pursuant
to Article L. 141-4 of the Monetary and Financial
Code, which sets out that “for the performance of
its duties, the Banque de France shall conduct expert
analyses” (see section Assessment).
THE DEFINITION OF SECURITY ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
To carry out its oversight task, the Banque de
France first of all develops risk analyses. In
consultation with all the parties involved, it then
defines the prerequisites for attaining the highest
possible and economically viable level of technical
security for each payment scheme considered.
Analysis of payment scheme risks generally takes
the following elements into account:
• the financial health of the issuer involved in the
payment scheme, with regard to the financial and
operational risks that it faces;
• the soundness of the contractual agreements between
the parties involved, which, inter alia, determines
users’ protection from the risk of financial loss, the
risk of the non-performance of transactions under
the expected conditions and the risk of fraud;
• technical and organisational security, which involves
protecting the payment scheme from dangers to
applications or the technical infrastructure.
The analysis is based on the construction of a model
for the payment schemes considered. Within the
model, descriptions of the functions implemented
must remain sufficiently generic so as not to
interfere with the technical and organisational
solutions adopted by the promoters of the payment
schemes.
The risks incurred are then distinguished according
to the gravity of their potential impact. All categories
of risk are taken into account, with special attention
being focused on those linked to fraudulent
activities.
The results of this risk analysis determine the
security objectives that represent the Banque de
France’s criteria for assessing the security level of
the payment scheme under consideration.
The risk analysis and the security objectives defined
are submitted for public consultation. This enables
parties involved to voice their opinions on the
relevance and efficiency of the security objectives
proposed. The final versions of the model, the risk
analysis and the security objectives are published
following this consultation.
The Banque de France has therefore taken part in
the definition of the various security standards and
frameworks. At the end of 2003 it launched a public
consultation on a cheque security framework. With
regard to credit transfers made via banking web sites,
the Banque de France, the General Secretariat of98 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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the Commission bancaire and the Conseil des marchés
financiers (Financial Markets Council) have asked
the CFONB to define a protection profile for Internet
banking and financial services. The objective of this
protection profile is to ensure that the dangers to
users and payment services are satisfactorily
addressed in a manner commensurate with the risks
assessed by the institutions. The Banque de France
has also contributed within the Eurosystem to the
definition of security objectives for electronic money
systems. This work led to the adoption by the
Governing Council of the ECB of a report entitled
“Electronic Money System Security Objectives
(EMSSO)”, which was published in May 2003 and is
henceforth used by the Eurosystem as a reference
for the assessment of electronic money systems.
ASSESSMENT
In addition to the analysis of information collected
on payment schemes, regular on-site assessments
help to enhance the efficiency of oversight.
In the interests of ensuring their independent
nature, the assessments are conducted by the
General Inspectorate of the Banque de France on
the basis of the security objectives defined.
It is then incumbent upon the issuer to take the
required steps to implement the recommendations
made by the Banque de France.
3|3 Actions complementing
oversight
As part of its task of overseeing payment schemes,
the Banque de France performs various activities
that contribute to the efficiency of this oversight.
FRAUD MONITORING
Combating payment instruments fraud relies on
the implementation of efficient detection and
reporting methods to assess the extent of the fraud
and facilitate the definition of preventive measures.
An efficient reporting tool is based first of all on
defining the range of acts considered to be
fraudulent and the typology of the fraud cases
observed, and then organising the collection of the
information required for the compilation of fraud
statistics from the parties involved (issuers,
merchants, the police force, etc.).
Fraud prevention calls for joint efforts and is largely
outside the competitive field. While protecting
the interests of all parties involved and
ensuring the confidentiality of personal data,
the Banque de France, in co-operation with issuers,
organises the exchange of the information required
for the compilation of fraud statistics.
At the national level, the Observatoire de la sécurité
des cartes de paiement, the Observatory for Payment
Card Security (see Box 2), is charged with compiling
fraud statistics for payment cards. To this end, it has
issued recommendations aimed at harmonising
fraud calculation methods in the different card
payment schemes. It published the fraud statistics
for the year 2002 in its 2003 Annual Report, and those
for 2003 in its press release of 6 October 2004.
Fraud prevention is also intended to be coordinated
at the European level. This is reflected in the work
of the European Payments Council (EPC, see Box 6)
in the area of card payments.
ANTICIPATING NEW FORMS OF FRAUD
The Banque de France maintains a technology
watch. It aims to keep an eye on the emergence of
new payment schemes, identify nascent threats that
could undermine the security of payment schemes
and analyse the impact of new technologies on the
payment services market.
The Banque de France has developed its own
expertise so as to be able to carry out in-depth
analyses and form an opinion on the assessments it
may commission from external experts. Its analysis
capacity has been strengthened by closer
co-operation with government organisations
responsible for information technology security.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 99
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BACKING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURE MEANS OF PAYMENT
The Banque de France relies heavily on
consultation to achieve its objectives in payment
schemes oversight.
In this respect, the Banque de France was charged in
2002 with leading a working group of the Mission pour
l’Économie Numérique (Mission for Digital Economy),
which is attached to the French ministry of the
Economy, Finance and Industry. In consultation with
both public and private sector representatives, the
Banque de France thus produced a forward-looking
analysis of online payment security. This work
led to a set of technical and organisational
recommendations aimed at strengthening the security
of online payment instruments. Two of these
recommendations, the implementation of services
enabling reliable and mutual authentication of the
parties involved in an online payment transaction and
the setting up of infrastructures making it possible to
provide all natural persons with an electronic identity,
are today recognised as being prerequisites for the
smooth functioning of online payments.
The Banque de France also encourages the banking
industry to be a real source of proposals in French
strategy in respect of e-governance. The Agence
pour le Développement de l’Administration
Électronique (Agency for the development of
e-governance), an inter-ministerial service attached
to the Prime minister’s office, has been set up and
charged with steering activities in this area. The
banking community is a central player in the
creation of an environment of trust for these types
of online services.
PARTICIPATING IN THE WORK OF THE OBSERVATORY
FOR PAYMENT CARD SECURITY
The Observatory’s work, in particular, its technology
watch and the compilation of fraud statistics should
in all likelihood be useful to the oversight of card
payment schemes. Consequently, and with a view to
generating the synergies required for the efficient
conduct of these two tasks, the secretariat of the
Observatory and the oversight of payment schemes
come under the remit of the same centre of expertise
at the Banque de France.
Box 2
The Observatory for Payment Card Security
Set up by virtue of the Everyday Security Act of 15 November 2001, the Observatory is chaired by the Governor of the
Banque de France. It is a forum for dialogue that brings together members of Parliament, representatives of the relevant
administrations, issuers of payment cards as well as retail and consumer organisations. The Banque de France provides
the Observatory’s secretariat.
The Observatory carries out three main tasks:
• monitoring the implementation of the measures adopted by issuers and merchants to enhance payment card security; it
keeps abreast of the principles adopted and the main developments in the area of security;
• compiling fraud statistics based on information disclosed by issuers of payment cards;
• a technology watch aimed at proposing methods for combating technological attacks.
Lastly, the minister of the Economy, Finance and Industry may refer to the Observatory for an opinion.
Every year, the Observatory submits an activity report to the minister of the Economy and Finance and to Parliament. The
2003 report may be consulted on the Observatory’s website: www.observatoire-cartes.fr100 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004
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The efficiency and security of payment schemes are vital to the smooth functioning of modern economies
and the maintenance of financial stability. It is therefore in the interests of not only market participants but
also central banks to maintain users’ confidence in payment schemes.
The way in which credit institutions adapt to sustain the balance between the security and efficiency of
means of payment to a large extent conditions the development of future risks and, therefore, users’
confidence in payment schemes. In this ever-evolving environment, central banks must play their role to
the full because they are the guarantors of confidence in the currency and must ensure the smooth
functioning of payment systems. The Banque de France constantly adapts in order to take on board all the
changes in this area and to be able to carry out the oversight task entrusted to it by the law.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 101
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1 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the Group of Ten Countries (2004): “Statistics on payment and settlement systems in selected
countries - Figures for 2002”, Bank for International Settlements, March
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APPENDIX
The various payment instruments
used in France
"TRADITIONAL” PAYMENT INSTRUMENTS
The table below indicates the breakdown, in number
of transactions and amount, of the main non-cash
payment instruments used in France since 1998.
Data for 1998 and 2002 are taken from the latest
edition of the “Red Book” published annually by the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS).1
While traditional payment instruments require the
use of physical devices – e.g. payment cards or paper
cheque forms – credit institutions execute the
payment orders initiated by these instruments
electronically, which facilitates the processing of
mass transactions. Boxes 3 and 4 of the Appendix
describe the procedures implemented in cheque or
card-based transactions.
THE SPECIFICITIES OF THE FRENCH RANGE
In 2002, an average of 130 non-cash payments was
made per year and per inhabitant in the euro area.
The use of non-cash payment instruments in the euro
area has been expanding in volume since 1998 at an
annual rate of around 5%. This regular rise is mainly
due to the increasing use of payment cards. France
is the European country where usage of non-cash
payment instruments is most widespread: French
citizens made an average of 218 non-cash payments
in 2002. Some 25% of all non-cash transactions made
in the EU are carried out in France.
France is one of the few remaining European
countries, along with the United Kingdom, where
cheques are widely used. Cheques issued in France
represent roughly 53% of the total volume recorded
in the European Union (28% for the United Kingdom).
As they are in France, payment cards are the most
frequently used payment instrument in the EU,
accounting for 32% of transactions. They rank ahead
of credit transfers (28%), direct debits (25%) and
cheques (14%).
A profoundly changing environment
THE EMERGENCE OF NEW PAYMENT SCHEMES
On the initiative of new entrants from sectors of
activity such as telephony or the Internet, new
payment schemes that are better adapted to the new
types of commercial relations such as e-commerce
have emerged.
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Box 3
Organisation of a cheque transaction
Since June 2001, cheques have no longer needed to be physically exchanged in order to be cleared between institutions,
as was previously the case in about a hundred “clearing houses” in France.
Henceforth, after being remitted for collection, cheques are “dematerialised” into computer files. These files known as
truncated cheques (TC) incorporate the information required for their clearing and processing and are cleared via SIT, the
French Interbank Teleclearing System.
The drawer therefore continues to use the paper cheque since it continues to receive blank cheque forms from the bank
holding its account, which it may subsequently remit as payment instruments to creditors. The creditor remits the cheques
it accepts for collection with its own bank, which, if it is itself a “presenting” bank in the exchange system, will carry out the
data processing required to create the truncated cheque. The TCs are then transmitted via SIT.
However, only the TCs are cleared. The presenting bank does not transmit the paper cheques but stores them for a period
of ten years. However, pursuant to criteria defined by the banking industry, the bank selects a small number of “circulating”
cheques that are sent to the drawee bank concurrently with the data, solely for verification and not accounting purposes.
These paper cheques are then exchanged via the Centre d’échange physique de chèques (CEPC – Centre for the
physical exchange of cheques). In addition, the drawee bank may also wish to receive copies of certain cheques stored at
the presenting bank. In such cases, the drawee bank requests a copy via SIT. Most often it will receive a reply directly by
























 of cheque forms  
Transmission 
of cheques  
Transmission   
of TC 
Transmission   
of TC 
Transmission of TC  





















Authentification of the cheque  
and drawee












of the drawee Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 103
ARTICLES
Oversight of non-cash payment schemes: objectives and implementation procedures
Box 4
Organisation of a “CB” card transaction
In France, the “CB” bank card enables card holders to make payments to merchants affiliated to the “CB” system. The card
holder is authenticated by means of a payment card and the keying-in of a secret four-digit personal identification number
(PIN), and for transaction amounts exceeding a certain threshold, by signing a credit card slip. The acquiring institution
guarantees the settlement of transactions presented for collection. Abroad, payments are made using international cards;
the customer is authenticated by signing a credit card slip.
To combat fraud, “CB” cards incorporate mechanisms for checking the identity and authorisation of the card holder
(verification of his/her identity and signature or PIN) and the authenticity of the card (detection of counterfeit cards). The
verification is carried out by the chip (micro-processor) embedded in the card or via the telematics services provided on
the computer servers of the card-issuing institution.
In a transaction involving the presentation of the physical card, the system thus uses the following main components:
• the chip card, which is the payment instrument and generates the electronic payment transaction;
• the acceptance system (payment terminal, ATM, etc.) which, inter alia, checks the authenticity of the card;
• the IT platform of the acquiring institution, the interface between the terminal and the RCB (Réseau des cartes bancaires)
or RSB (Réseau de services aux banques) interbank networks;
• the RCB or RSB networks, which transmit requests for authorisation;
• the  IT platform of the card-issuing institution, which replies to requests for authorisation.
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These new schemes are often backed by one or more
“traditional” payment instruments that have been
adapted to the new communication channels
(Internet and mobile telephone networks).
Cases in point are online payment mechanisms
aimed at enabling fund transfers between
individuals (“peer-to-peer”). In these transactions,
the initiator first opens an account with a financial
intermediary and credits it via a credit transfer,
direct debit or card payment. The initiator then
provides the details of a beneficiary that it contacts,
for instance through e-mail, to inform him/her that
the funds have been made available with an
intermediary. It is then up to the beneficiary to
contact the intermediary to obtain the funds
through a transfer to his/her own bank account.
Other payment solutions put in place by telephone
operators or Internet access providers are generally
based on similar principles. They make it possible to
settle purchases made from merchants that accept
this type of payment via a telephone call or by logging
on to a website. There are several procedures. In some
cases the operator includes the amounts due to
merchants in the telephone bill that it sends to the
caller. The bills are then settled by cheque, transfer
or direct debit. In other procedures, the caller pays
the operator in advance by purchasing prepaid cards
or crediting an “account” using a “traditional” payment
instrument. Once the purchases have been made, the
operator transfers the amounts owed to the merchants.
CHANGES AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL
Payment schemes are part of a European
environment that is undergoing profound legal and
regulatory changes.
Almost two years ago, the European Commission took
the initiative of launching a broad-based consultation
on the appropriateness of, and procedures for, creating
a harmonised legal framework for payment services
within the European Union. The Commission made
proposals on regulations in the areas of efficiency and
security of means of payment, access to payment
services markets, competition and user protection
(see Box 5).
The different phases of consultation conducted thus
far by the Commission have clearly revealed a broad
consensus on the need for the harmonisation and
simplification of the rules governing payment
schemes. They have nevertheless also shown that
the choice of methods used to this end is under
debate.
While significant efforts have also been undertaken
by European banks they have so far had a limited
impact on the euro area payments markets. In
June 2002, the European banking industry set up a
European Payments Council (EPC, see Box 6). The
Council has outlined an ambitious working
programme to create a Single Euro Payments Area
and has proposed significant changes to the
organisation of payment services in the European
Union. A new European payment service for euro
credit transfers has thus been set up. A number of
other initiatives geared towards the establishment
of the Single Euro Payments Area, such as the
development of the Pan-European Direct Debit
(PEDD) scheme, are also underway.
To ensure the smooth operation of the euro payment
system, the Eurosystem is focusing on identifying
obstacles to the creation of an integrated European
area for non-cash payments and working out how
to overcome them.
The Eurosystem has thus published four reports in
five years on euro area payment services, initiated
an ongoing dialogue with the EPC and developed
security and efficiency objectives for electronic
money systems. Studies are currently underway on
the payment instruments that are of common
interest to all euro area countries and whose
potential cross-border use is significant. At present,
they concern first and foremost card payment
schemes.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 5 • November 2004 105
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Box 5
New legal framework for payments in the internal market
The provisions set forth in the new legal framework should apply to all instruments intended for the European market.
These are essentially credit transfers, direct debits, card payment schemes and various electronic payment schemes.
Cheques and cash do not come under the scope of application of the new legal framework.
The principles defined for the drawing up of the new legal framework cover the efficiency and security of payment services,
conditions of access to the payments market and user protection.
The efficiency and security of payment services should include aspects such as the irrevocability of payment orders,
commitments in respect of payment order processing times.
Service providers that wish to develop payment services should be subject to an authorisation procedure based on terms
and conditions that are yet to be defined. The principle of Europe-wide mutual recognition of authorisations should be
maintained: a service provider that has obtained authorisation in one EU Member State should automatically receive
authorisation in the other Member States of the Union.
The protection of users of payment services should focus mainly on information disclosure requirements as well as the
rights and obligations of the parties involved in the payment in the event of dispute or fraud.
The Banque de France and the Commission bancaire support the Commission’s undertaking to promote efficient and
secure payment services, a level playing field, adequate customer protection and the technical, as well as legal, security
of payment transactions by implementing an appropriate legal framework. The fact that payment services providers include
funds to be transferred in their assets is a source of financial risk for the public and puts the case for a statute. In his regard,
the Banque de France and the Commission bancaire are in favour of establishing a procedure for authorising and supervising
all institutions that are liable to provide payment services, within the framework of statutes adapted to the diverse features
and risks of these services. The development of these activities must be promoted under conditions that are satisfying
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Box 6
European Payments Council
The European Payments Council (EPC), which was set up in June 2002 by the European banks, has developed its own
project for creating a single European payments market, known as the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). The EPC,
which is the forum for consultation and decision-making among European banks, has set 2010 as the year for the
achievement of this ambitious objective.
The EPC’s work is based on close collaboration with the Eurosystem. The European Central Bank takes part in the
different working groups set up by the EPC as an observer.
The pan-European harmonisation of payment instruments and the designing of an integrated clearing infrastructure have
been considered indispensable to the implementation of the SEPA.
The harmonisation of instruments has taken concrete form in the creation of a pan-European credit transfer known as
Credeuro, which is fully automated and has a maximum total execution time of three banking business days, and in the
decision to create a pan-European direct debit whose pilot tests should be launched at the end of 2006. Work on combating
international payment card fraud is also underway.
The EPC has defined a model for clearing infrastructures known as PE-ACH (Pan-European Automated Clearing House).
All European infrastructures shall be required to comply with the criteria defined in PE-ACH. The STEP 2 system, which is
operated by the Euro Banking Association (EBA), is the first infrastructure to comply with these criteria.